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The Gardeners of Vimy 
Canadian Corps' Farming Operations 
during the German Offensives of 1918 
S.F. Wise 
"~e Gardeners of Salonika" was Georges 
~ Clemenceau's jibe at the French and 
British divisions tied down in entrenchments 
round the Greek port for a good part of the First 
World War, because all they seemed to do was 
dig, rather than launch a Balkan offensive. 1 The 
Canadian Corps, from Field Marshal Haig's 
perspective, was similarly removed from the war 
when Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie, 
strongly supported by the Canadian govemment, 
refused to accept the piecemeal breakup of the 
Corps to help shore up the British line during 
the great German offensive which began in March 
1918. Haig never forgave this rebuff, and his diary 
is studded with unfavourable comparisons of the 
Canadians with the Australians, who permitted 
their divisions to be detached from the corps 
organization and shifted to menaced sectors of 
the Western Front. 
As a result of Currie's action, which Lord 
Derby, the British Secretary of War, forced Haig 
to accept, three of the four divisions which made 
up the national army were restored to Canadian 
command, occupying the Vimy bastion and lines 
extending from it northward. The Corps had last 
fought in a major operation in October /November 
1917, at Passchendaele; it was not to be 
employed again (except for small operations 
incidental to holding a substantial portion of the 
front) until the climactic battle of Amiens in 
August 1918. In the interim, while the Allies 
fought with their backs to the wall to stem the 
great series of German onslaughts, the 
Canadians, secure in the immensely strong lines 
they had created around Vimy, were given 
opportunity to rest and to train for the moment 
when they would be used to spearhead a renewal 
of the Allied offensive against the German army. 2 
The Canadians held a vital and extensive part 
ofthe Allied line, and were obviously performing 
a major defensive function during the long weeks 
of the German offensive, even though their 
relative inaction occasioned much British 
resentment. In that sense they bear little 
resemblance to the Gardeners of Salonika. In 
another, however, they were the genuine article, 
and can legitimately be termed "The Gardeners 
of Vimy," for during the spring and summer of 
1918, as well as guarding the Vimy lines, the 
Canadian Corps was also involved in battle zone 
farming in a big way. How did the Corps come to 
be engaged in an essentially peaceful and bucolic 
enterprise, especially during such a critical 
period? 
This activity was completely unknown to me, 
until a few references in the enormous finding 
aid to Record Group 9 in the National Archives 
of Canada piqued my curiosity. The Canadian 
Corps, as a large fighting formation of over 
100,000 men, required many non-fighting units 
and sub-units to support it in the field, supply 
it, provide it with reinforcements, medical 
services, legal and police services, and so on. All 
its parts generated masses of paper, and much 
of this is deposited in Record Group 9. Among 
this immense volume of documents is to be found 
a memorandum of early 1918 entitled "Suggested 
Establishment for Agricultural Employment 
Coy.," signed by Major F. C. Washington, who is 
identified as "Canadian Corps Agricultural 
Officer." Why did the Corps need an Agricultural 
Officer and an Agricultural Employment 
Company? The story that emerges from 
fragmentary evidence is incomplete, yet while 
hardly of cosmic significance, is an unusual and 
interesting one. 
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Two Canadian soldiers helping French peasants at farm work. 
Washington's memo does not answer either 
question, because it is simply a set of 
administrative recommendations that wound up 
on the desk of the Corps Commander. It provides 
for an establishment of five officers -himself at 
the Corps level and one for each of the Canadian 
divisions in the field - a French interpreter, a 
Company Sergeant-Major and a Quartermaster 
Sergeant, 8 Sergeants, 8 Corporals, 8 Lance 
Corporals, a shoeing smith Corporal and 5 
shoeing smiths who were privates, and 325 other 
ranks, including 5 cooks and a stenographer! A 
one-ton truck, 36 heavy draft horses and 18 
general service wagons completed the 
establishment. The whole, Washington thought, 
"should be sufficient to do all agricultural work 
required in this area, as soon as seeding has been 
completed. "3 
Sir Arthur Currie supported Washington's 
recommendations in a letter to the administrative 
branch of British First Army, the formation to 
which the Canadian Corps belonged for most of 
1918. He pointed out that the Corps "has been 
providing a considerable number of personnel 
for agricultural work," some to help French 
farmers in the Corps area, about 60 men 
"employed under the French Agricultural Officer 
at Arras," and 150 men needed "for Corps and 
40 
Divisional Farms which supply food for Corps 
requirements. The total acreage to be placed 
under cultivation for this purpose is 1400, of 
which much will be cultivated for vegetables." 
Currie, as we shall see, had no problem with 
members of the Corps engaging in farm work. 
He did not believe, however, that this should be 
at the expense of battalions or batteries in the 
line, and proposed instead that an Agricultural 
Company, as laid out in Washington's draft, 
should be approved as a permanent farming unit, 
and its members should be replaced in their 
original units by reinforcements from the training 
establishment in Britain. 4 
Currie's readiness to engage in farming on 
the Western Front, though it may have been 
helped by his having grown up on a farm near 
Strathroy, Ontario, was in fact in conformity with 
policy laid down by the British government, which 
instructed GHQ to carry it out. As announced by 
Brigadier-General Lord Radnor, GHQ's Director 
of Agricultural Production, the policy was 
intended to address the "impending world 
shortage of food for human consumption." The 
British government had decided that "the English 
Armies undertake the growing of certain 
foodstuffs in the way of green vegetables and 
potatoes ... on the lands on which they now find 
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where potatoes are to 
be planted. 
themselves," and in addition do what they can to 
help "the French Agriculturalists and those of our 
other Allies." It was also hoped that the pressure 
on shipping, already great because of losses to 
German submarines, would be reduced 
somewhat. Lord Radnor's announcement set 
scales for vegetable production, authorized the 
use of farming implements from derelict French 
and Belgian villages, ordered the appointment 
of agricultural officers for armies, corps, 
divisions and areas, laid down the chain of 
command within this structure, and outlined the 
manner in which any surplus beyond the needs 
of units and formations would be dealt with. 5 
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What exactly did Radnor mean by directing 
that the British Armies, and by extension its 
Canadian, Australian and New Zealand 
components, were to grow vegetables "on the 
lands on which they now find themselves"? Major 
Washington clarified this for the Canadian Corps, 
pointing out that it was "not intended that ground 
which will be cultivated in the regular way by the 
French Population be used for this purpose." All 
lands farmed by the Corps would be in the Corps 
Area, adjacent to camps, training grounds, and 
other such establishments, and all of them not 
simply within sound of the guns but in the area 
immediately behind the Corps' defensive trench 
system. This included land which had been 
fought over and won by the Corps and long 
deserted by the French, some of it cratered or 
disfigured by fieldworks, battery positions and 
other surviving marks of the military uses to 
which it had been put by Germans and Allies.6 
The 1,400 acres mentioned by General Currie 
was therefore not a single block of land, but 
scattered, in bits and pieces like the small 
holdings of a medieval village, behind the 
divisional areas and in the vicinity of battery 
positions. In early February the quartermaster 
branch of the Canadian Corps undertook an 
initial survey to discover how much land had 
been taken up by the formations and units of the 
Corps for farming, and found that progress varied 
considerably. "While some divisions have made 
very little progress, one Division has undertaken 
the cultivation of 300 acres. In addition to this, 
the Corps Agricultural Officer has two Corps 
Vegetable Farms, at Marqueffles and Berthonval, 
totalling nearly 200 acres." The leading division 
was undoubtedly the Fourth (General Watson), 
which in addition to a divisional vegetable garden 
of 125 acres boasted the 1 00-acre farm of one of 
its infantry brigades, then in reserve at Servins, 
and a large number of smaller plots. For example, 
each of its field artillery batteries had 2-acre 
gardens, and so did each of its field companies 
of engineers, while the divisional Machine Gun 
Battalion was farming 10 acres, and such units 
as the Signal Company, the Field Ambulance, and 
Divisional H.Q. itself were each cultivating 2 
acres. 7 
As befitted a military organization, the 
instructions and planning for the farming 
operation were elaborate. We may take as an 
example the instructions issued by the First 
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Canadian Infantry Brigade, the premier brigade 
of the First Canadian Division, regarded by 
contemporaries and by many since as one of the 
finest divisions in the whole of the British Army 
on the Western Front. The First Division got a 
late start in the farming business, but got itself 
organized in March to catch up. Thus First 
Brigade Headquarters assured its infantry 
battalions and associated units that there was 
"plenty of ground for gardening in the forward 
area." If more land was required, the Agricultural 
Officer would rent it from the owners. Units were 
instructed that "small plots should be dug -large 
plots ploughed," to a depth of five or six inches. 
Do not, soldier farmers were told, "bring raw 
chalk to the surface." Lots of manure was readily 
available, since abandoned French farmhouses 
were distinguished by the presence of 
mountainous piles of rotting manure just outside 
the kitchen door; 20 to 30 loads of it should be 
applied per acre. It was to be thoroughly worked 
into the soil by cultivators or harrows, or by rakes 
and hoes in the smaller plots. 8 
Not only were specific instructions for 
preparing the soil issued to the gardeners of the 
Corps, but inspecting eyes were watching to see 
that the job was well done. Major B. W. Browne, 
the Deputy Assistant Adjutant General (DAAG ), 
First Division, warned the Divisional Agricultural 
Officer in mid-March that "it has been noticed 
that some units are wasting quite a lot of good 
ground because of a few shell holes, and patches 
are left presumably on account of having a bit of 
couch grass or heavier growth than the remainder 
of the ground; further, headlands9 are not marked 
out as they should be before commencement and 
consequently each individual ploughman begins 
and finishes where he feels disposed." The 
Agricultural Officer, therefore, was instructed to 
reprove units tolerating such discreditable 
practices, letting them know that it "requires no 
more labour to do the work in an orderly, 
workmanlike and proper manner than in a 
slipshod and careless way." Farm work, it was 
made clear, must be performed in a soldierly and 
uniform fashion. Browne's findings were 
disputed by Captain G.F. Dudley, Transport 
Officer of 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, who 
claimed that "the sector being cultivated by 2nd 
Can. Inf. Bde. is being farmed in an ordered 
manner, as near to 'home' conditions as is 
possible. Shell holes are filled in, couch-grass 
burned off before plowing, headlands marked 
4
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Table I 
Number of Plants or Probable Yield in Vegetable %of Area Amount of Seed Pounds 
needed to plant Area 
1. Cabbage 30% - 48 poles 3,500 plants 10,000 lbs. 
2. Kale 20% - 32 poles 2,250 plants 6,750 lbs. 
3. Savoy 10%- 16 poles 1,600 plants 2,500 lbs. 
4. Leeks 5%-8 poles 3,000 plants 1,250 lbs. 
5. Beets 5%-8 poles 5 oz. seed 1,000 lbs. 
6. Carrots 15% - 24 poles 12 oz. seed 1,000 lbs. 
7. TUrnips 10%- 16 poles 5 oz. seed 2,240 lbs. 
8. Swedes 5%-8 poles 2 1/2 oz. seed 1,120 lbs. 
Totals 150 poles = 4840 yards = 1 acre 25,860 lbs 
administered by Radnor, would advance to 
Armies the money to buy piglets, but military 
pig farmers were warned that "no issues of goods 
or forage in kind will be made from Army stocks, 
nor will purchases of these be made from money 
advanced. The feeding of the pigs will be entirely 
from the swill produced by units. "16 In 
excruciating detail, instructions were sent out 
advising on the correct method of constructing 
sties (they should face south, and have sloping 
floors; brick or stone buildings were best. 
because pigs prefer to be cool.) Swill should be 
heated occasionally, to give piglets a dietary fillip. 
Large numbers of military swineherds were not 
required: "it is considered that three men should 
be sufficient to tend and feed 150 pigs." 
Slaughtering was to take place under the 
superintendence of the Army Service Corps and 
the Veterinary Corps. 
At least in the Canadian Corps, piggertes were 
not pushed by authority with the same vigour as 
vegetables, a tribute to common sense. Brigadier-
General J.M. Ross of the 5th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade thought that brigades were not the right 
formations to manage pig farms, because of their 
frequent moves. Such disruptive changes would 
"defeat the project, the success of which depends 
upon the suitable housing and careful feeding of 
the animals." The CRA of 2nd Division told 
Division HQ that "this formation has no 
proposals to submit, please," while the 4th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade observed that in the 
trench lines "there is no refuse or swill available, 
and it would be difficult to produce food for young 
pigs in this uncultivated district." Perhaps, 6th 
Brigade suggested helpfully, raising pigs was 
something Division Headquarters staff might take 
on? 
When, in July, the Quartermaster General 
of the British Army directed that "all large 
centralised pig farms already in existence will 
be abolished, and the keeping the piggeries on 
a small scale will be left in future to individual 
enterprises on the part of Units," no dissent 
was heard from the Canadian Corps, and it is 
probable that pigs never took wing there. 17 
Did the Canadians maintain their 
gardening project throughout the spring and 
summer of 1918, despite the German attacks? 
To what degree was their garden project 
unusual? If they were able to maintain it, how 
successful was it? Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to give a complete answer to any of 
these questions, but what evidence there is 
permits some conclusions. 
In the first place, the Canadian Corps was 
by no means alone in its front-line farming. 
Since First British Army, of which it was a part 
until late July, was also relatively exempt from 
German attack during the spring and summer, 
other formations within it also engaged in 
farming. On the other hand, it seems most 
unlikely that Fifth British Army, which bore 
the brunt of the initial German attack on 21 
March, was permitted the necessary period of 
consolidation, and the same holds for Third 
British Army, its neighbour. 18 The operational 
records of the Australian Corps, which I have 
examined for the May-August 1918 period 
(when elements of this Corps were with both 
Second and Fourth British Armies), are silent 
on the subject, and since Australian divisions 
were in action for most of the period of the 
German offensive, it would appear that farming 
was out for them. It is quite possible, however, 
45 
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that other elements of Second Army in Flanders 
did some farming, as would rear echelon British 
units. It should be noted that agricultural 
activities were by no means unusual to the rear 
of German divisions, since the bulk of the 
German Army on the Western Front had been 
on the defensive from the early days of the war, 
and its divisions, once in position, tended to 
stay put. It has been remarked that "the 
German system of allocating divisions to a 
sector of front was a far more permanent one 
than that of the Allies. Once posted to a sector, 
a German division stayed there to attack, 
defend, or hold trenches for as long as 
possible. "19 As a result, German divisions 
exploited the French countryside for foodstuffs, 
including operating their own farms. 20 
On 2 7 March 2nd Canadian Division was 
ordered to the Third Army front; it was not to 
return to the Canadian Corps until 1 July. What 
became of its gardening operations? The 2nd 
Division area was taken over by the 2nd 
(Lowland) Division; did this mean that the 
Scottish formation took over its gardens as well? 
Second Division's Agricultural Officer was 
Lieutenant R.E. Ferguson; on 8 May he was told 
by his divisional DAAG that "It is proposed to 
retain possession of the Farm throughout the 
season, and you will please note that you are not 
to vacate or give up the property without definite 
instructions being received from these 
Headquarters. Kindly keep this Office advised of 
progress which is being made." This seems 
explicit enough, but to make doubly sure that 
the Scots did not interfere with the divisional 
farm, Second Division HQ approached the 2nd 
Division, and received assurance from its 
commanding officer that "I have no objection to 
your Divisional Agricultural Officer and farm 
personnel carrying on operations at the Divisional 
Farm." Presumably, when during the first week 
of May the First, Third and Fourth Canadian 
Divisions were pulled out of the line to begin a 
long period of intensive training in infantry-tank 
collaboration and open warfare that was to 
continue until July, each division adopted a 
similar expedient, and continued to farm its 
acreage with "farm personnel" of the division. 21 
In fact, we know that this was so, because of an 
order issued by Brigadier-General G.J. Farmar, 
the BGGS "A" of the Canadian Corps, on 25 July 
1918, virtually on the eve of the Battle of 
Amiens, and sent to all divisions: 
46 
In order to ensure that all crops in the 
Canadian Corps Area are harvested as soon 
as they are ready, Area Commanders are 
authorized to call on units in their area to 
supply whatever assistance in the way of men 
and horses required by the Farmers. The Corps 
Commander is extremely desirous that 
everything possible should be done by units in 
this Corps to ensure that no waste of crops 
occurs through lack of labour to harvest, and 
this assistance should be given whenever the 
exigencies of the service permit. 22 
How successful was the farming operation? 
On 21 August, just as the Canadian Corps was 
leaving the Ami ens sector for a new theatre, First 
Army held a Conference on Agriculture at its 
Headquarters, at which the Canadian Corps was 
represented. The Army Agricultural Officer 
announced that in the Army Area, 3,600 tons of 
potatoes had been produced, and were now 
available for distribution. The minutes betray the 
existence of some friction over the mode of 
distribution; "it was realised that some Divisions 
and Units might feel dissatisfied at the potatoes 
grown on a farm worked by them being issued 
broadcast," but this was a labour-saving solution 
which would "work most simply and smoothly 
from the supply point of view." One can imagine 
the scarcely suppressed grumbling on the part 
of diligent farmers like the Canadians at this piece 
of authoritarian legerdemain; in any environment 
other than the military there would have been 
bitter argument. On the other hand, First Army 
was not impolitic enough to attempt to impose 
the same kind of mechanism upon the vegetable 
farmers, whose produce would become available 
"in large quantities" by the beginning of 
September. The meeting concluded with planning 
for the 1919 crop year, and the warning that 
"manure on lands rented for horse standings and 
in rented stables belong to the British 
Government ... In future it was to be dumped on 
the vegetable farms where possible," instead of 
being allowed to fall into the hands of grasping 
French peasants. 23 
Unfortunately these minutes disclose nothing 
about the productivity of Canadian Corps farming 
operations, and there does not seem to be any 
documentation giving such information. Nor 
(with one exception) is there any account of 
farming at the unit level in any of the battalion or 
other units histories of the CEF. The exception 
is Lieutenant-Colonel H.M. Urquhart's history 
of the 16th Battalion, a unit of the 3rd Infantry 
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Brigade of the 1st Canadian Division. The 16th 
farmed 105 acres near Bully Grenay, with 
seeds and young plants provided by "Q" 
Branch. Farming staff were chiefly men with 
low medical categories (most of them B2) drawn 
from non-fighting units in the divisional area, 
plus teams and drivers from battalion transport 
and field artillery batteries. The 16th Battalion's 
farmers scrounged old plows and harrows they 
found on the battlefield, and rented some from 
French farmers. The harvested crop was 
testimony to the farming skills of the unit, 
exceeding Major Washington's estimates in 
every respect- 278 tons of potatoes, 22 tons of 
turnips, 79 tons of cabbages, 8 tons of carrots 
and 3 tons of beets - an unheralded triumph 
which may well have been matched by many 
other Canadian units during their long respite 
from active military operations.24 
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